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MIXED OPTIMIZATION: DIAGNOSIS AND PROPOSED
SOLUTION FOR SEVERAL PROBLEMS
IN THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY
JESSE HERCULES*
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE PURPOSE of this paper is to describe several interre-
lated problems in the airline industry, explore economic
and legal causes, and propose a solution using federal aviation,
antitrust, and bankruptcy laws.
The airline industry has been plagued with bankruptcies.
Since 1978, there have been 162 airline bankruptcies, and four
recent airline bankruptcies are among the largest corporate
bankruptcies ever.' The United States Government Accounta-
bility Office reports that "[b]ankruptcy is endemic to the airline
industry,"2 but that airlines have had "mixed results in reducing
costs while under bankruptcy."3
Ticket prices tend to "frustrate consumers because they ap-
pear to be neither predictable nor rational."' Consumers face
large differences in price based on "day of travel, time of day,
and a variety of other factors, all of which are subject to frequent
change."' 5 Additionally, airline flights are often delayed-in
* Jesse Hercules graduated summa cum laude from the University of Mississippi
School of Law in 2006. He is admitted to practice in the State of Tennessee. He
holds a multi-engine commercial pilot license with instrument rating. Prior to
law school, Mr. Hercules worked in information technology at GE Aircraft
Engines in Cincinnati, Ohio. He graduated from Northwestern University in
2001, with a degree in Industrial Engineering and a second major in Economics.
U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTIABILITY OFFICE, COMMERCIAL AVIATION: BANKRUPTCY AND
PENSION PROBLEMS ARE SYMPTOMS OF UNDERLYING STRUCTURAl ISSUES 3 (2005)
[hereinafter GAO BANKRUPT(A].
2 Id. at 2.
3 Id.
4 Daniel P. Rollman, Comment, Flying Low: Chapter 1] 's Contribution to the Self-
Destructive Nature oj Airline Industry Economics, 21 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 381, 392
(2004).
5 Id.
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2000, more than a quarter of airline flights arrived at least fif-
teen minutes late.6 Although a cyclical decline in air traffic has
reduced delays, long-term traffic predictions suggest that con-
gestion will soon return.7 Since it typically takes ten to twenty
years to plan, get regulatory approvals, and construct a new run-
way at a major airport,8 our airports cannot easily add capacity
to meet demand.
These problems are the result of a clash of two completely
different business models within the airline industry: the linear
model and the hub-and-spoke model. The linear model, exem-
plified by low-cost carriers like Southwest, has a large cost advan-
tage.' The hub-and-spoke model, exemplified by legacy airlines
like United, gives an airline the ability to charge high prices
when it dominates a hub."° This clash of business models-one
based on cost control and one based on pricing power-leads to
problems of serial bankruptcy, irrational pricing, and needless
congestion.
Several federal laws have shaped and contributed to the eco-
nomic problems in the industry. The Civil Aeronautics Board
("CAB") price and route regulations prior to 1978, combined
with the Taft-Hartley Act authorizing collective bargaining,1
burdened legacy carriers with high wages and benefits they
6 Christopher Mayer & Todd Sinai, Network Effects, Congestion Externalities, and
Air Traffic Delays: Or Why Not All Delays Are Evil, 93 Am. ECON. REV. 1194, 1194
(2003).
7 U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, COMMERCIAL AVIATION: LEGACY AIRLINES
MUST FURTHER REDUCE COSTS TO RESTORE PROFITABILITY 14 (2004) [hereinafter
GAO PROFIT].
8 Challenges Associated with Building New Runways: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Aviation of the Comm. on Transportation and Infrastructure, 106th
Cong. 13 (2000) (statement of John J. Duncan, Jr., Subcomm. Chairman) (De-
troit began planning for two new runways in the mid-1980's. One was completed
in 1993, but the other is not expected until the end of 2001. Cincinnati started
work on a new runway in 1992, but it won't be completed until 2005. Orlando
expects its fourth runway to be completed in 2003, 15 years after the FAA first
approved it.).
9 GAO PROFIT, supra note 7, at 24 (explaining that in 2003, "'legacy airlines'
unit costs were 67% higher" than low-cost carrier unit costs).
10 OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SEC'Y FOR AVIATION & INT'L AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF
TRANSP., DOMESTIC AVIATION COMPETITION SERIES: DOMINATED HUB FARES 2
(2001) [hereinafter HUB FARES] ("In dominated hubs as a whole, 24.7 million
passengers pay on average 41% more .... ").
11 GAO PROFIT, supra note 7, at 4 ("Similar to other highly regulated indus-
tries, the airline industry was heavily unionized .... ").
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could no longer afford after deregulation. 12 Legacy airlines
turned to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code to level the play-
ing field."3 In bankruptcy, the airlines can reject aircraft
leases,' 4 terminate pensions, 15 reject labor agreements,"6 reject
contracts already signed, 7 and pay pennies on the dollar to un-
secured creditors.'" However, legacy airlines still have not
closed the cost gap' 9 because even in bankruptcy they have been
unable to escape the high-cost hub-and-spoke business model.2 °
The major airlines have not found a way to fill their largest and
most efficient aircraft except by using the inefficient hub system
to generate connecting traffic.
The competition between linear and hub airlines follows a
pattern: the linear airline adds routes through a legacy airline's
"dominated hub" airport while the legacy airline attempts to de-
fend its hub using predatory pricing.21 If the linear carriers are
successful in gaining market share, the legacy airline loses pric-
ing power and profitability at the hub.22 When a legacy airline
loses enough pricing power at enough of its hubs, it files Chap-
ter 11 bankruptcy and retrenches to its strongest remaining
hubs.23 This competitive cycle benefits neither the legacy air-
12 Id. at 27 ("Labor costs accounted for over 40 percent of the unit cost differ-
ence between legacy airlines and low cost airlines in 2003.").
13 GAO BANKRUPTCY, supra note 1, at 59 ("Bankruptcy has become a well-trav-
eled path by which some legacy airlines are seeking to shed some of their costs
and become more competitive.").
14 11 U.S.C. § 1110 (2006) (giving airlines a sixty day window to decide
whether to reject aircraft leases and preventing creditors from repossessing air-
craft during that time).
15 GAO BANKRUPTCY, supra note 1, at 10 ("With the approval of the bankruptcy
courts . . .companies may also modify retiree benefits.").
16 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (2006) (allowing rejection of collective bargaining
agreements).
17 See id. § 1123 (2006) (allowing bankruptcy plans to include rejection of ex-
ecutory contracts).
18 Id. (allowing bankruptcy plans to impair unsecured claims).
19 GAO PROFIT, supra note 7, at 24 ("Legacy airlines, as a group, have been
unsuccessful in sufficiently reducing their costs to make them more competitive
with low cost airlines.").
20 Id. at 26 (listing the low asset utilization caused by the hub-and-spoke model
as a major cause of the cost gap).
21 Paul Stephen Dempsey, Predation, Competition & Antitrust Law: Turbulence in
the Airline Industry, 67 J. AIR L. & COM. 685, 736 (2002).
22 HUB FARES, supra note 10, at 1 (explaining that passengers at a dominated
hub pay 41% more on average than passengers flying in hub markets with low-
fare competition).
23 U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., IMPACT OF AIR CARRIERS EMERGING FROM BANKRUPT Y
ON HUB AIRPORTS, AIRPORT SYSTEMS AND U.S. CAPITAL MARKETS 12 (2003) [here-
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lines nor the consumers who continue to pay higher prices at
dominated hubs. The hub-and-spoke system also creates peri-
ods of peak congestion and delays at airports, 24 so the survival of
hubs is costly to travelers facing delays as well as to taxpayers
funding new runways and terminals.
This paper proposes using federal aviation antitrust laws to
implement a new model of competition- called mixed optimiza-
tion. Under mixed optimization, a consumer is able to buy air-
line transportation from different carriers on different legs of a
trip without a cost penalty. The consumer's bags would be in-
terchanged from one airline to another as needed. This combi-
nation of features would increase consumer choice and result in
more effective price competition. But this method would also
benefit the industry. By increasing the amount of potential con-
necting traffic at each airport, it offers legacy airlines a way to fill
large aircraft without the hub-and-spoke system. Linear carriers
will not be confined to high-density routes because many of
their customers will connect to legacy and regional airlines'
flights. The peak traffic congestion associated with hubs will dis-
appear, reducing delays and capacity problems.
II. TWO BUSINESS MODELS FOR AIRLINES
There are two predominant business models today in the U.S.
airline industry. The legacy airlines and their regional code-
sharing partners adopted the hub-and-spoke model, which has
higher costs but allows them to charge higher prices when they
have dominant market share at a hub or a spoke. The low-cost
carriers adopted the linear model, which offers low costs due to
high asset utilization and labor productivity.
A. THE HUB-AND-SPOKE MODEL
The legacy airlines adopted the hub-and-spoke model in the
1980s, soon after deregulation. A route structure with a single
hub and many spokes would look like a bicycle wheel. The leg-
acy airlines each have several interconnected hubs within the
continental United States.25
inafter HuB AIRPORTS] ("Airports that are secondary hubs of financially weak air
carriers . . . are generally more vulnerable than are primary hubs . . . during
periods of retrenchment.").
24 Mayer & Sinai, supra note 6, at 1195 ("[H]ub carriers often choose to cluster
their flights at periodically spaced 'hubbing times' . . . at the cost of higher
congestion.").
25 HUB AIRPORTS, supra note 23, at 12.
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There are three advantages to the hub-and-spoke model.
First, the dominant airline at a hub (which is often also domi-
nant at the spoke) has considerable market power and the abil-
ity to charge higher prices.26  The Department of
Transportation ("DOT") has concluded that 24.7 million pas-
sengers at "dominated" hubs pay an average of 41 % more than
passengers at airports with price competition from low-cost com-
petitors. 27 The passengers at the "spokes" pay even more-DOT
estimates that they pay 54% more than passengers at airports
with price competition from low-cost competitors. 2' The DOT
study concludes that there is no quality of service justification
for the higher fares.29
Second, a continent-wide network of hubs and spokes allows a
single airline to provide service from "anywhere to every-
where."3 In mathematical terms, "[j]ust one new round-trip
flight from a hub where an airline already connects to N cities
will create 2Nadditional connecting routes" and thus "the num-
ber of potential connections grows exponentially .... ."'I How-
ever, this advantage also creates a barrier to competition. By
discounting connecting travel, raising prices for single-leg travel,
and refusing to interchange bags, a network airline can prevent
other airlines from effectively competing for any one leg of a
connecting trip.
The third advantage of hubs is the ability to funnel passengers
onto large aircraft for long-haul trips. Cost per seat-mile tends
to decline as aircraft size increases.12 Cost per seat-mile also de-
creases as the (nonstop) length of the trip increases.33 Because
a legacy airline can generate so much connecting traffic at a
hub, it can fill a large aircraft like a Boeing 747-400 for long-
26 HuB FARES, supra note 10, at 2 ("From a consumer perspective, the primary
disadvantage of network hubs is the level of market power that the hub carrier is
capable of amassing and the higher prices consumers pay as a result.").
27 Id.
28 Id. at 3.
29 Id. ("The four rationales commonly used to explain away high fares in hub
markets-passenger mix, operational cost, quality of service, and the Southwest
Effect-only apply if price competition is not present. It is the lack of price com-
petition, not the rationales listed, that explain high prices at hub markets.").
30 GAO PROFIT, supra note 7, at 5.
31 Mayer & Sinai, supra note 6, at 1195.
32 Dempsey, supra note 21, at 706 ("In the long-haul (1,400 miles) narrow-body
aircraft category, American Trans Air had costs of 5.4 cents per ASM [available
seat mile] .... In the long-haul wide-body aircraft category, American Trans Air
had ASM costs of only 4.1 cents .....
33 GAO PROFIT, supra note 7, at 25.
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haul trips across the country (or across an ocean) at a low cost
per seat-mile. However, this potential cost advantage is offset by
the costs incurred in bringing connecting traffic into the hub.
The hub-and-spoke model also has three disadvantages. First,
hubs cause artificial congestion. Like the roadways used by com-
muters, a hub airport has its own version of rush hour. As
Mayer and Sinai explain, "hub carriers often choose to cluster
their flights at periodically spaced 'hubbing times' to create the
greatest variety of passenger destinations[,] but these conve-
nient connections come at the cost of higher congestion."3 4 As
a result, they find that "hub airports will have more traffic and
greater delays than non-hub airports of equivalent size and with
equal local demand. 35
Second, hubs cause low asset utilization. An airplane asset is
'utilized'-making moneyw-when it is flying, not when it is sit-
ting on the ground. The congestion and delays caused by the
hub model cause the legacy airlines to have significantly lower
asset utilization than their linear model competitors.3 6 The air-
craft all descend on the airport at the same time, and then sit
and wait for the passengers and bags to transfer for the out-
bound trip. Since the "clock" is always running on aircraft loans
or leases, the airline loses money when its planes are not in the
air.
The third disadvantage is low labor productivity at hub air-
ports. 37 While the airplanes are all in the air, the labor force is
under utilized. When the aircraft all arrive at the same time
(and sit un-utilized), then the labor force can be productive in
loading, fueling, towing, and de-icing the planes. It is only a
slight exaggeration to say that either the airplanes are produc-
tive and the workforce is sitting around, or the workforce is pro-
ductive and the airplanes are sitting around.
The hub-and-spoke model has been expanded through the
use of code-sharing. In a code-sharing arrangement, two air-
lines each agree to let the other sell tickets for its flight and
4 Mayer & Sinai, supra note 6, at 1195.
35 Id. at 1197.
36 GAO PROFIT, supra note 7, at 28-29 ("[B]ecause legacy airlines generally op-
erate a hub-and-spoke business model, they are not able to operate their aircraft
for as many block hours per day as low cost airlines .... [T] hey continue to trail
low cost airlines with respect to asset utilization trends.").
37 Dempsey, supra note 21, at 692 ("Though hubbing increases costs by lower-




agree on bag-exchange procedures.38 Therefore, a consumer
can buy a ticket from one airline for a trip that uses two airlines'
route networks. The most common example is a consumer who
buys a ticket from a "major" airline, but actually uses a separate
regional airline for a leg from a small airport to a hub. A con-
sumer who buys a ticket from United and rides in a small turbo-
prop labeled "United Express" may be surprised to learn he is
actually riding on a Great Lakes Airline flight.3" However, leg-
acy carriers sometimes code-share with each other411 or with a
foreign carrier, such as the Northwest/KLM code sharing agree-
ment on flights from the United States to Europe. 41
Although code-sharing would seem to offer more choices to
consumers, "[c]iarriers with a code-sharing agreement at one of
the airports on a route charge fares almost 8% higher than car-
riers do on routes on which they do not code share. 42 Legacy
airlines will refuse to code-share with low-cost carriers.4 3 There-
fore, selective code-sharing can be a means for legacy airlines to
concentrate market power and prevent low-cost airlines from
competing for connecting traffic.
B. THE LINEAR MODEL
Southwest and the new low-cost airlines that have appeared
since deregulation use a linear model instead of a hub-and-
spoke model.44 The linear route structure often looks very
38 1I. at 695.
39 Id. at 758 ("Code-sharing is a way of defrauding consumers into believing
they will be flying a megacarrier's jets, when on most occasions they are funneled
onto a smaller carrier's turboprop aircraft at the hub, all in a deliberate attempt
to steer feed traffic away from jet competitors.").
40 Northwest Airlines Global Alliance Partners, http://www.nwa.com/
corpinfo/allia/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2006) (showing that Northwest, Continental,
and Delta are code-sharing on certain routes).
41 Id.
42 Dempsey, supra note 21, at 697 (quoting Airline Competition Enhancement Act
of 1989: Hearing on S. 1741 Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the Comm. on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation, 101st Cong. 253 (1990) (statement of Kenneth M.
Mead, Director, Government Accountability Office Transportation Division)).
43 Dempsey, supra note 21, at 756 (explaining that Frontier Airlines, a low-cost
carrier, wanted to code-share with United in order to generate enough traffic to
support jet service to smaller cities in the Great Plains area. United Senior Vice
President Rakesh Gangwal refused, saying, "Frontier is a low-cost provider.
United can never be a low-cost provider. Therefore, we think of you as the
enemy.").
44 GAO PROFIT, supra note 7, at 5 ("Low cost airlines entered the marketplace
after deregulation and primarily operate point-to-point service from 'focus cities'
using fewer types of aircraft.").
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much like a bus or train route structure-a straight line with
stops along the way. In other cases, the linear structure takes
the form of point to point service-an aircraft flies back and
forth between city pairs.
The linear model is highly efficient from an asset and labor
utilization perspective.45 Flights are more likely to arrive and
depart on time, since they are scheduled to arrive at scattered
times rather than all at once. 46 Aircraft on the ground can be
fueled, loaded, and sent back out quickly-they are not waiting
for other flights with which to "hub.''47 Labor productivity is
higher 41 since work is spread evenly throughout the day.
Passengers flying linear model airlines have fewer delays for
the same reasons explained above. However, the scheduled lay-
over for a linear model passenger will be longer because flights
are scattered throughout the day instead of clustered.4" In
mathematical terms, the median trip length (except for non-
stops) will be longer, but the variance will be less.
Airlines using the linear model have tended to operate fewer
models of aircraft, producing crew training and maintenance
savings.50 Linear model airlines, for example Southwest5' and
JetBlue,5 2 tend to operate mid-sized aircraft rather than aircraft
at either end of the size spectrum. Linear model airlines do not
45 Dempsey, supra note 21, at 692 ("[H]ubbing increases costs by lowering air-
craft, gate, and labor utilization and increasing fuel consumption .... ").
46 Mayer & Sinai, supra note 6, at 1195 ("Non-hub carriers.., have no incen-
tive to cluster flights at the same peak hubbing times and thus will incur fewer
delays than the hub carrier.").
47 GAO PROFIT, supra note 7, at 29 ("Low cost airlines typically operate a point-
to-point business model that allows them to limit the amount of time a plane
must spend on the ground from the time it lands until it is ready to take off
again.").
48 Id. at 27 ("Low cost airlines have been effective at keeping unit labor costs
down by achieving higher labor productivity .... ").
49 Mayer & Sinai, supra note 6, at 1197 (explaining that in "the extreme case
* . . [an] airline minimizes congestion costs by scheduling a uniform number of
arrivals and departures throughout the day. That strategy produces the longest
connection times .... ").
50 GAO PROFIT, supra note 7, at 28 ("[L]egacy airlines usually have more types
of aircraft in their fleets, adding to maintenance costs and pilot training costs.").
51 Southwest Airlines Fact Sheet, http://www.southwest.com/about-swa/
press/factsheet.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2006) (showing that Southwest oper-
ates a fleet consisting of 441 midsize Boeing 737s).
52 JetBlue Airways Fact Sheet, http://www.jetblue.com/learnmore/factsheet.
html (last visited Mar. 30, 2006) (showing thatJetBlue operates a fleet consisting
of 77 midsize Airbus A320s).
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offer intercontinental ocean-crossing flights," and therefore
have less need for large, long-range aircraft.
Linear model airlines tend to offer a simplified fare sched-
ule.54 This is possible because their business model is based on
low costs rather than on pricing strategy. Passengers who book
within two weeks of travel, or who change their schedules, do
not face large price penalties.55
Linear model airlines typically have offered service on high-
density routes.56 This allows them to expand without the need
to offer a network of hub-and-spoke connections. For example,
the way to attract the most passengers if an airline is only serving
two cities is to pick two cities with a lot of passengers traveling
between (not connecting through) the cities. This strategy
makes sense because legacy airlines' pricing and bag-in-
terchange practices prevent the linear airlines from competing
on just one leg of a connecting trip. But this strategy limits their
expansion to high-density routes only.
C. CHANGING BETWEEN THE Two MODELS
Given the disadvantages of the hub-and-spoke model, it is rea-
sonable to ask why the legacy carriers-even in bankruptcy-
have not simply converted to a linear model. The reason the
legacy airlines are unable to adopt the linear model is because
their aircraft fleet is not suited for linear operations. Legacy air-
lines have invested millions of dollars in large, efficient aircraft
such as the Boeing 747-400 and Boeing 777. American Airlines,
for example, has 296 airliners that are larger than the typical
linear carrier aircraft.57 If a mid-size A320 or Boeing 737 is opti-
mal for non-connecting linear flights, then who is filling the re-
maining 100 or more seats on a large aircraft? These seats are
filled by passengers connecting through to other destinations.
If a legacy airline switched to a linear model with its existing
aircraft, it would lose money when its large aircraft flew half-
53 GAO PROFIT, supra note 7, at 6 ("Low cost airlines do not yet offer service
outside Canada, Central America, and the Carribean.").
54 Id. ("These [low-cost] airlines offer a simplified fare structure. ).
55 Id. (explaining that their simplified fare structure is "attractive ... because
they do not have restrictive ticketing rules that make it significantly more expen-
sive to purchase tickets within 2 weeks of the flight or make changes to an ex-
isting itinerary.").
56 Id. at 5-6.
57 American Airlines, Fleet Profile, http://www.aa.com/content/amrcorp/cor-
poratelnformation/facts/fleet.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2006) (American's
A300, 777, 767 and 757 aircraft are larger than Southwest's 737s).
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empty. But if it somehow switched to an all mid-size fleet, the
legacy airline would abandon its one area of efficiency and ex-
pertise-flying large airliners on long-haul and international
routes.
Even from a public policy viewpoint, it is not clear that legacy
carriers should switch to a linear model. Smaller communities
in the United States are largely served by regional airlines. Re-
gional airlines' passengers depend on the ability to connect
through to their destinations after reaching the nearest large
airport. Forcing the legacy airlines into a mid-sized fleet on a
linear model would harm smaller communities by taking away
the ability to connect easily to the rest of the country. A true
solution to the airline industry's problems must leverage the ex-
pertise and aircraft fleet already in place at legacy, linear, and
regional airlines.
III. HOW FEDERAL LAWS SHAPE COMPETITION
Several important federal laws and regulatory regimes have
shaped and contributed to the economic problems now facing
the airline industry. The legacy of fare and route regulation,
the bankruptcy code, the antitrust laws, the labor laws, and the
pension laws have acted and interacted to affect the airline
industry.
The Civil Aeronautics Board ("CAB") regulated the fares and
route structure of the airline industry from its infancy until der-
egulation in 1978.58 The United States General Accounting Of-
fice ("GAO") finds that the "'legacy' airlines carried over the
[high] cost structures that had been protected by price regula-
tion."59 The legacy airlines all adopted the costly hub-and-spoke
network model,60 whereas the new airlines "employ the less
costly point-to-point service model. '61 The legacy carriers prob-
ably adopted the hub-and-spoke system because it offered a way
to cover their high cost structures through high prices, which
are less painful to an organization than cost-cutting. Their
adoption of the hub-and-spoke model led them to invest in large
aircraft suited for aggregating connecting traffic.
58 GAO BANKRUPTCY, supra note 1, at 4.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 5 ("Each of the legacy airlines adopted a hub-and-spoke network





Even if the major airlines had attempted to cut costs after der-
egulation, it would have been difficult due to the effects of two
other federal laws. The Employee Retirement Income Security
Act ("ERISA") prevents employers from reducing vested bene-
fits,62 so the pensions negotiated during CAB regulation must be
paid with money earned in the lower-price deregulated market.
The Taft-Hartley Act and other federal labor laws" authorize
collective bargaining and strikes. Once a generous package of
wages, benefits, and work rules has been established under col-
lective bargaining, adjusting that package to changing market
conditions is difficult due to the threat of a strike. Other union-
ized industries that enjoyed long periods of prosperity, such as
the steel and automotive industries, are facing similar problems
with locked-in pension obligations and the "ratchet effect"
caused by generous wage, benefit, and work-rules packages in
prosperous prior years.64
The legacy airlines have looked to the federal bankruptcy laws
as a way to counterbalance the cost impact of the period of regu-
lation and the labor and pension laws.6 5 In Chapter 11 bank-
ruptcy, legacy airlines can reject aircraft leases,6" terminate
pensions," reject labor agreements, reject contracts already
signed,69 and pay pennies on the dollar to unsecured credi-
tors.7" In U.S. Airways' 2003 bankruptcy, the airline unloaded
$2.1 billion in unfunded pension obligations onto the Pension
Benefit Guarantee Corporation, a federal corporation.7 In
United Airlines' 2004 bankruptcy, employees agreed to wage
62 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (2006).
63 See generally 29 U.S.C. § 401 (2006).
64 Amy Lassiter, Note, Mayday, Mayday!: How the Current Bankruptcy Code Fails to
Protect the Pensions of Employees, 93 Ky. L.J. 939, 939 (2005).
65 GAO BANKRUPTCY, supra note 1, at 59 ("Bankruptcy has become a well-trav-
eled path by which some legacy airlines are seeking to shed some of their costs
and become more competitive.").
C6 11 U.S.C. § 1110 (2006) (gives airlines a sixty day window to decide whether
to reject aircraft leases, and prevents creditors from repossessing aircraft during
that time).
67 GAO BANKRUPTCY, supra note 1, at 10 ("With the approval of the bankruptcy
courts . . .companies may also modify retiree benefits.").
68 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (2006) (allows rejection of collective bargaining
agreements).
69 See id. § 1123 (allows bankruptcy plans to include rejection of executory
contracts).
70 Id. (allowing impairment of unsecured claims).
71 Lassiter, supra note 64, at 946.
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cuts of $2.5 billion per year.72 Using just the threat of bank-
ruptcy, in 2004 Delta negotiated a 32.5% cut in pilot wages.
However, the GAO's "analysis of major airline bankruptcies
shows mixed results in reducing costs while under bank-
ruptcy. '74 Airlines like U.S. Airways and TWA have been
through more than one Chapter 11 bankruptcy in a short times-
pan,75 showing that the court approved reorganization plan did
not work. Despite the bankruptcy of five of the seven legacy air-
lines since deregulation, 76 "[1]egacy airlines, as a group, have
been unsuccessful in reducing their costs to become more com-
petitive with low cost airlines. ' 77 Notably, even in bankruptcy,
the legacy airlines did not propose changing their basic hub-
and-spoke business model.
The airline industry has also been affected by lax enforce-
ment of the federal antitrust laws. The Department of Trans-
portation ("DOT") approved all twenty-one mergers submitted
during the 1980s. 78 The mergers allowed the industry to be-
come even more "highly concentrated" at the fifty largest air-
ports, according to the Justice Department's mathematical
Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index test.79 In addition to allowing
mergers, the DOT has failed to challenge the more recent wave
of code-sharing agreements that tend to raise prices"° and con-
solidate the market for international travel."' Perhaps because
72 Id. at 948.
73 James Pilcher, Delta Pilots OK 32.5 % Pay Cut, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Nov. 12,
2004, available at http://www.enquirer.com/midday/ I1/ 11122004_News-mday_
deltal2.html.
74 GAO BANKRUPTCY, supra note 1, at 2.
75 Id. at 17.
76 Continental, Delta, Northwest, United, and U.S. Airways have filed for Chap-
ter 11 bankruptcy. Alaska and American have not.
77 GAO BANKRUPTCY, supra note 1, at 7.
78 Dempsey, supra note 21, at 701 ("The Department of Transportation has
been widely criticized for approving each of the 21 mergers submitted to it in the
1980s.").
79 Id. at 693 (explaining that an HHI above 1800 is deemed highly concen-
trated. The weighted average concentration at the fifty largest airports rose from
2,217 in 1977 to 3,870 by 1988).
80 Id. at 697 (quoting Airline Competition Enhancement Act of 1989: Hearing on
S.1741 Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, 101st Cong., 253 (1990) (statement of Kenneth M. Mead, Direc-
tor, Government Accountability Office Transportation Division)) ("Carriers with
a code-sharing agreement at one of the airports on a route charge fares almost
8% higher than carriers do on routes on which they do not code share.").
81 Dempsey, supra note 21, at 701 ("The DOT has also given major airlines
antitrust immunity to form global code-sharing cartels, further concentrating the
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of many complaints8 2 the Justice Department has made at-
tempts to enforce the laws against predatory pricing.8" How-
ever, legacy airlines have been able to preserve many dominated
hubs at which twenty-four million consumers still pay about 41 %
more on average than at airports with low-cost competition. 4
The current legal model offers no real solutions for legacy
airlines. Long ago, they adopted the hub-and-spoke model in
an attempt to cover the costs imposed on them by CAB regula-
tion. They cannot switch to a low-cost linear business model
(even in bankruptcy) because their fleet of large aircraft would
fly half-empty without hub-driven connecting traffic. Bank-
ruptcy is at best a partial fix, allowing them to reduce certain
legacy costs such as wages and pensions. Mergers offer them a
way to gain market share and raise prices. However, legacy car-
riers will eventually lose that market share to low-cost linear air-
lines unless they adopt an illegal strategy of predatory pricing.
IV. THE CURRENT COMPETITIVE MODEL
The current economic problems facing the airline industry
are the result of a clash between the linear model and the hub-
and-spoke model. The linear model is based on low cost, but
the hub model is based on pricing power. When businesses us-
ing these two models compete (and go through bankruptcy cy-
cles), a pattern emerges that defines the current airline
industry.
A. IF THERE WERE No LINEAR MODEL AIRLINES
The financial problems of legacy carriers are not caused by
competition between themselves. When they compete only with
each other, the legacy airlines are able to charge high enough
prices to cover their costs. A DOT study compared three mar-
kets where legacy carriers competed only with each other versus
three similar markets where there was competition from linear
market for connecting traffic and depriving independent airlines the opportunity
to compete for it.").
82 Id. at 690 (explaining that between 1996 and 2000, thirty-two complaints of
predatory behavior were filed).
83 Id. at 699 (giving an example: the Justice Department filed suit against
American Airlines based on predatory pricing at its Dallas/Fort Worth hub,
which was intended to drive low-cost rivals out of the market and preserve Ameri-
can's ability to charge high prices at DFW over the long term).
84 HUB FARES, supra note 10, at 2.
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model airlines.8 5 One-way fares were 213% higher when there
was no competition from linear model carriers."6 The GAO esti-
mates that legacy carriers' operating costs are only 67% higher
per seat-mile than the linear model carriers.8 7 Although this is a
rough comparison, it shows that legacy carriers are able to com-
mand high enough prices to cover their costs when they do not
have to compete with linear model carriers.
B. HuB INVASION AND DEFENSE
Linear model airlines are growing by invading the legacy car-
riers' markets. "In 1998, low cost airlines operated in 31.5 per-
cent of the markets served by legacy airlines, and provided a low-
cost alternative to 72.5 percent of passengers. By 2003 .
[t] hey operated in 45.5 percent of the markets.., and provided
a low cost alternative to 84.6 percent of passengers .... ."8 Lin-
ear model airlines grew from a 23% share of total passenger traf-
fic to 33% during the same period." Legacy airlines have lost
$24.3 billion since 2000, while the linear model airlines have
posted $1.3 billion in profit.90
Sometimes, the linear model airline can establish a new route
without provoking a price and capacity war with the incumbent
legacy airline. This is most likely to happen when the linear air-
line has a very strong balance sheet, like Southwest Airlines. 91
"Most major network carriers have learned that Southwest is too
strong to beat, and do not enter into competitive battles with
it."'92 Linear airline JetBlue built a $128 million war chest before
its first flight. As a result, "it has not been subjected to the pred-
atory conduct described herein, for it is, quite simply, too finan-
cially strong to kill." 93
However, the usual pattern of competition between linear
model and hub model airlines is a predatory pricing war. Pro-
85 Id. at 9.
86 Id.
87 GAO PROFIT, supra note 7, at 24 ("[B]y 2003, legacy airlines' unit costs were
67 percent higher [than low-cost carriers on 1,000 mile stage lengths].").
88 Id. at 43-44.
89 Id. at 44.
90 Id. at 34.
91 Dempsey, supra note 21, at 719 (quoting Robert Rowen of Reno Air: "If it's
a long-term player with a strong balance sheet like Southwest, they react moder-
ately compared to a Kiwi or Reno Air.").
92 Id.
93 Id. at 690 n.4 (citing Lorraine Woellert, Take Airline Reform Off Standby, Bus.
WK., Jan. 24, 2000, at 50).
704
2006] MIXED OPTIMIZATION 705
fessor Paul Stephen Dempsey, in the Journal of Air Law and
Commerce, described it as follows:
1. Major airline establishes dominance at airport serving major
city.
2. Dominance allows major airline to price well above competi-
tive levels.
3. When a new entrant attempts to enter a major airline's hub,
dominant airline responds with below-cost pricing, capacity
dumping, and/or a number of other predatory practices until
the new entrant is driven out.
4. Once the new entrant is driven out of the market, dominant
airline raises prices to levels sometimes higher than those prevail-
ing before the new entrant attempted entry.
9 4
The Department of Justice ("DOJ") also concluded that leg-
acy airlines use predatory practices to defend hubs. The DOJ
prosecuted American Airlines for the following 1996 predatory
behavior:
[W]hen an LCC [low cost carrier] entered a DFW [Dallas/Ft.
Worth International Airport] route and it appeared that the LCC
would be economically viable if American simply followed a
profit-maximizing business strategy, American would instead sat-
urate the route with enough additional capacity at low fares to
keep the entrant from operating profitably.
95
The DOJ concluded that the purpose and effect of this strategy
was to drive out the low-cost rival so that American could raise
fares again.96
This predatory behavior is the best explanation for ticket
prices that tend to "frustrate consumers because they appear to
be neither predictable nor rational. 9 7 Since airlines' costs are
relatively stable, wildly fluctuating prices are probably caused by
predatory pricing rather than normal price-setting based on
cost.
C. LEGACY AiRLINES USE BANKRUPTCY TO RETRENCH
If the low-cost entrant withstands the predatory conduct, the
legacy airline permanently loses pricing power in that market. 9s
94 Dempsey, supra note 21, at 736.
95 Id. at 699-700.
I" ld. at 700.
'7 Rollman, supra note 4, at 392.
98 HUB FARES, supra note 10, at 9 ("We have repeatedly demonstrated the large
reduction in prices that typically follows entry by a low-fare carrier in markets
with a history of high average fares ....").
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However, the legacy airlines will have some dominated hubs and
monopoly routes on which they can still charge a high price.
When this "mix" of low-price and high-price fares fails to cover
the legacy carrier's overall cost structure, the carrier must file a
Chapter 11 bankruptcy to reduce costs.
The DOT describes the legacy carriers' prospective cost re-
duction process as follows: "[L] arge network air carriers will (1)
retrench to primary hubs, (2) downsize secondary hubs, (3)
convert secondary hub service from an overwhelming reliance
on large jet aircraft to a fleet comprised primarily of regional jet
aircraft, or (4) eliminate some network hubs."9 The DOT study
gives three typical examples of airlines downsizing or eliminat-
ing secondary hubs related to bankruptcy: U.S. Airways at Pitts-
burgh, United Airlines at San Francisco, and American Airlines
(TWA bankruptcy) at St. Louis.' Dominated "primary" hubs
such as United's Chicago hub and American's Dallas/Fort
Worth hub are less vulnerable to downsizing.10 1
GAO data shows that the legacy carriers are achieving their
cost reductions primarily through capacity reduction (becoming
smaller) rather than unit cost reduction (becoming more effi-
cient). 11 2 This is further evidence that the legacy airlines are
shrinking in size but unable to change their underlying cost
structure. The reason legacy carriers will downsize or abandon
secondary hubs is because they have lost the dominant market
share needed to charge high prices there. They will use bank-
ruptcy to retrench to their primary hubs, where they still domi-
nate and can still charge high enough prices to cover their high
costs. Unable to convert to a low-cost linear airline model today,
the legacy carriers are using bankruptcy to postpone the need
for change. However, they will have to return to bankruptcy-
perhaps more than once-as they continue to downsize and
retrench.
D. CONSUMERS AND TAXPAYERS LOSE
The current competitive model in the airline industry is
harmful to consumers and taxpayers. Consumers at dominated
-9 HUB AIRPORTS, supra note 23, at 4.
100 Id. at 7-8.
101 Id. at 12.
102 GAO PROFIT, supra note 7, at 3 (explaining that legacy airlines reduced
expenses 14.5% between 2001 and 2003, but this was accompanied by a 12.6%
reduction in seat capacity. "Despite the cost-cutting efforts of legacy airlines over
the last couple of years, legacy airlines' unit costs have not been reduced ....").
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hubs pay significantly higher fares with no increase in service
quality.1"3 Wildly fluctuating prices elsewhere, due to predatory
price wars between legacy and linear airlines, are a burden to
consumers10 4 who must spend more time price-shopping and
plan their travel dates based on artificial price changes. Con-
sumers at hub airports face frequent delays and artificial conges-
tion caused by hubbing.'0 5 This artificial congestion creates a
need for more runways and terminals that cost taxpayers.1 0 6 Per-
haps most importantly, new runways now take ten to twenty
years to plan and construct, so we may be unable to add enough
capacity to overcome projected congestion under the hub
system. 107
V. PROPOSED COMPETITIVE MODEL
OF MIXED OPTIMIZATION
This section proposes a new model of competition which will
eliminate the economic and public policy problems caused by
the current competitive model. The new model is discussed
along with means to implement it using either a new statute or
existing federal regulatory and antitrust laws.
A. DEFINING MIXED OPTIMIZATION
Mixed optimization essentially involves two changes to the
current system. The first change is to prohibit airlines from
making the ticket price on one flight dependent on whether a
103 HUB FARES, supra note 10, at 3 ("The four rationales commonly used to
explain away high fares in hub markets-passenger mix, operational cost, quality
of service, and the Southwest Effect-only apply if price competition is not pre-
sent. It is the lack of price competition, not the rationales listed, that explain
high prices at hub markets.").
104 Rollman, supra note 4, at 392.
105 Mayer & Sinai, supra note 6, at 1197 ("hub airports will have more traffic
and greater delays than non-hub airports of equivalent size and with equal local
demand.").
106 U.S. Fed. Aviation Admin., Airport Improvement Program Overview, http:/
/www.faa.gov/airportsairtraffic/airports/aip/overview/ (last visited Mar. 31,
2006) (explaining that airport improvements at large hub airports are 25% lo-
cally funded and 75% federally funded by taxes on airlines).
107 Challenges Associated with Building New Runways: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Aviation of the Comm. on Transportation and Infrastructure, 106th Cong. 13 (2000)
(statement of John J. Duncan, Jr., Subcomm. Chairman) ("In the last decade,
aircraft departures increased by about 30 percent, airline passengers increased by
40 percent, and air cargo increased by an astounding 90 percent. Yet during that
time [the 1990s], . . . the Department of Transportation says that only five new
runways were added at large airports.").
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customer purchases a seat on a connecting flight. Airlines today
charge much more for tickets purchased separately than for the
same route purchased as a connecting flight. For example, the
author recently priced a trip from Memphis to Salt Lake City.
Buying the complete trip from American Airlines through its
Dallas hub cost $431. But buying tickets on the same flights sep-
arately cost $391 and $353, for a total of $744.108 Under mixed
optimization, the cost would have been identical for both
quotes.
The second change required under mixed optimization is to
require airlines to interchange bags with every other airline. It
is clearly feasible for competing airlines to interchange bags for
connecting passengers, since they already do this today for their
code-sharing partners. This change will require detailed regula-
tory implementation. However, the airline industry is already
highly regulated and used to working closely with United States
Department of Transportation regulators. In addition, the
agency will be able to model its regulations on successful private
code-sharing agreements to ensure fairness and feasibility.
From a consumer point of view, mixed optimization will look
a lot like the current system of code-sharing. A consumer will
buy a single ticket for a route between his origin and destina-
tion, but the route may include two or more airlines during dif-
ferent legs of the trip. The consumer will check baggage on his
first flight and pick it up from the carousel at his destination
without the need to retrieve and re-check bags at intermediate
stops. So, from the consumer's perspective, it will look as if all
carriers simply agreed to do code-sharing with each other.
B. TECHNOLOGY ENABLES MIXED OPTIMIZATION
Advances in technology since deregulation in 1978 make
mixed optimization feasible. In particular, consumers today can
connect directly to computerized reservation systems and bags
can be tracked using wireless inventory systems.
1. Computerized Reservation Searching
The current hub-and-spoke system makes searching easy by
restricting choices. For example, there are only a few practical
choices for a flight from Memphis to Salt Lake City. You can fly
United through Denver, American through Dallas/Fort Worth,
108 Using Expedia.com on March 24, 2006, for flights leaving on May 9 and
returning on May 15.
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or Northwest through Minneapolis. There is little reason to in-
vestigate mixed itineraries, such as flying Northwest to Phoenix
and then completing the trip on Delta, since they are almost
certain to be more expensive. The practical searching al-
gorithm is to request a quote from each carrier that serves both
cities and accept whatever routing and connections they happen
to offer. A consumer with a pencil, paper, and a telephone can
effectively use this algorithm by calling each of the airlines
directly.
Mixed optimization offers more and better choices to the con-
sumer, but the sheer number of choices could make searching
more difficult. To be sure of getting the best price (or the best
compromise between cost and travel time), a consumer would
need to check every combination of flights that starts out in the
origin city and ends in the destination city. Assuming a passen-
ger has three potential flights from each of three airlines con-
necting through each of the fifty largest airports, there are 450
possible itineraries. This number grows exponentially as more
stops or more choices at each stop are added. There is no way
for a consumer, armed only with a pencil and a telephone, to
compare this bewildering array of options.
Only a computerized search system can find the best needle
in this haystack of potential choices. But this is no longer a
problem. Computerized systems have been available to travel
agencies for more than fifteen years, and for almost ten years
consumers have been able to connect directly to powerful in-
ternet search and reservation systems like Travelocity and Ex-
pedia. So the consumer with only a pencil and a telephone can
have a travel agency do the computerized search, while an in-
ternet-savvy consumer can perform the computerized searching
himself.
Of course, the website providers and travel agencies would
have to reprogram their database structures and search logic af-
ter mixed optimization. There would be many more connec-
tions available, but only one price per flight leg offered at any
given time. Since pricing becomes less complex while connec-
tions become more complex, it appears that the overall com-
plexity of the programming should be roughly the same as
today. The programmers could also reduce complexity by elimi-
nating choices that are obviously impractical. A practical search
algorithm for domestic flights might eliminate routes that
double the distance traveled and routes involving more than two
connections. A practical search algorithm might also eliminate
2006]
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flights with connection waiting times over five hours and total
travel times over twelve hours. These or similar limitations on
search scope will reduce programming complexity and com-
puter hardware cost with very little loss of practical choice to the
consumer.
In the previous Memphis to Salt Lake City example, a con-
sumer would still consider the United flights connecting
through Denver, but also all other potential connections
through Denver. Denver is an ideal connection since it adds less
than 1% to the mileage compared to traveling nonstop.10
Mixed connections through Kansas City (4% increase in mile-
age), St. Louis (12% increase), and Dallas/Fort Worth (13% in-
crease) should be considered. 110 Connections through New
York City (206% increase) or Honolulu (568% increase) are
probably not worth investigating, even for a computer.1 '
After eliminating clearly impractical choices, travel agencies
and websites will present the best choices to consumers by using
a detailed profile for each consumer. For example, the profile
could list the relative importance of reducing travel time, reduc-
ing cost, reducing the number of stops, increasing amenities,
and decreasing delays. The available flights would be sorted so
that the most preferable itineraries appear at the top. The con-
sumer who is looking for a first-class seat on a nonstop flight
should not have to look through a long list of two-stop routes on
low-cost carriers that only offer coach.
2. Wireless Tracking of Luggage
The second technological advancement that enables mixed
optimization is wireless tracking of luggage. Mixed optimization
depends on airlines' cooperation with each other to exchange
bags in a quick and reliable manner. If airlines could offer ex-
cellent bag-interchange on their own connections and terrible
bag-interchange on connections to other carriers, they could
discourage consumers from scheduling routes that included
multiple airlines. However, today it is feasible to combine wire-
less inventory tracking with airline-specific operational rules to
create a fair and enforceable system of bag interchange.






Wireless inventory tracking systems, commonly known as Ra-
dio Frequency Identification ("RFID") systems, have sensors
mounted in the ceiling above a store or warehouse. 1 2 They
send and receive signals from inexpensive RFID "barcodes" at-
tached to items of inventory." 3 For example, a computerized
inventory system can count the items of inventory in stock and
track their movement and location within a warehouse."14 Air-
ports and airlines are beginning to use this system today." 5
Under mixed optimization, each airport would create a large
bag interchange area. This area would be subdivided into zones
for each airline. When a consumer connects from one airline to
another, bag handlers for the "inbound" flight will move the bag
to the outbound airline's zone within the interchange area.
Then, workers from the outbound airline will pick up the bag
and load it on the appropriate outbound flight.
The new bag interchange system creates two new failure
modes. First, the inbound airline could be late in moving the
bag to the interchange area. Second, the inbound airline could
take the bag to the wrong outbound carrier's interchange zone.
(Two other failure modes already exist today: the outbound car-
rier could be late in loading the bag onto the outbound flight,
and the outbound carrier could load the bag onto the wrong
flight.) An appropriate set of deadlines and penalties, based on
RFID data, can ensure that bags reach their customers at least as
well as today. 16
112 IBM BUSINESS CONSULTING SERVICES, RADIO FREQUENCY IDENTIFICATION AND




"5 IBM BUSINESS CONSULTING SERVICES, THE UNTOLD RFID STORY 4 (2004),
http:/ /www.ibm.com/industries/wireless/doc/content/bin/ProductInnova-
tion in Electronics.pdf (Las Vegas McCarran Airport will soon require all bags to
be tracked using RFID).
116 The RFID system can determine who is at fault when a consumer doesn't
get his or her bag at the destination. By polling the RFID tags each minute, the
wireless inventory system can create a record of the time each bag entered an
airline's interchange zone. This information shows whether the inbound airline
brought the bag to the right outbound carrier's interchange zone on time. If so,
any of the other failure modes are the fault of the outbound carrier.
Knowing who is at fault does not solve the problem of returning lost or mis-
routed bags to the customer. The correct approach is to make the destination
airline responsible for getting the bag to the customer. The customer should
have only one point of contact for resolving complaints-it is not feasible for
customers to deal with two or three airlines who each insist that the lost bag is the
other airline's problem. It is much more feasible to ask the baggage personnel
2006]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AMD COMMERCE
C. INDUSTRY CHANGES DUE TO MIXED OPTIMIZATION
Mixed optimization will produce profound and permanent
change in the airline industry. It will give the legacy airlines a
practical alternative to the hub-and-spoke system, ending the
problems hubs are causing for consumers and for the industry.
Under mixed optimization, airlines will specialize according to
their existing areas of expertise and fleet mix.
The most immediate industry change will be a breakup of the
relationship between regional airlines and legacy carriers. For
example, Great Lakes regional airline transports passengers
from around the Great Plains region into United's Denver hub.
On arrival, these passengers connect to their destinations on
United flights only-it would be cost prohibitive to recheck bag-
gage and connect on a different airline. However, under mixed
optimization, the Great Lakes passengers will connect to out-
bound flights on many different airlines. It seems unlikely that
United will continue paying Great Lakes on a per-flight contract
basis when United derives no special benefit from the Great
Lakes flights. Similarly, the other legacy carriers will end their
contracts with their partner regional airlines.
The regional airlines will grow under mixed optimization, de-
spite the loss of their contracts with the legacy carriers. Re-
gional airlines' passengers will have many more connecting
flights and final destinations to choose from, since they will be
able to connect to any airline upon reaching the large airports.
This will lead to higher passenger loads on the regional airline
flights. The regional airlines have a competitive advantage and
considerable experience in bringing passengers from smaller
communities to large airports using smaller aircraft; they will
simply become more successful in this niche.
The legacy airlines will specialize in flying large aircraft on
long-haul and international routes. Because large aircraft on
long routes have the lowest costs per seat-mile, the legacy air-
lines will become cost-competitive on these routes if they dis-
mantle their expensive hub-and-spoke networks. Under mixed
optimization, they will no longer need the hub-and-spoke net-
from the destination airline to work with the baggage personnel of the other
airline(s) to find and retrieve the bag.
However, the destination airline should be able to recover statutory penalties if
the inbound airline is at fault. The penalties will compensate the destination
airline for its extra work in getting the bag to the consumer when the other
airline was at fault.
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work to generate enough traffic to fill these large aircraft-they
can draw connecting traffic from all airlines serving the large
airports. So, under mixed optimization the legacy carriers will
abandon the hub-and-spoke system and start to undercut today's
"low cost" airlines on routes that support large-aircraft service.
The legacy carriers will also use their long-range aircraft to
offer nonstop flights that the low cost airlines (flying medium-
range aircraft) cannot duplicate. Legacy carriers will charge a
premium for these flights, since consumers are willing to pay
more for a nonstop flight than a comparable one-stop flight.
The legacy carriers also have decades of experience in providing
long-range international service. There is no indication that the
low-cost carriers intend to challenge them in these markets. So
the legacy airlines' expertise in operating and maintaining
large, long-range aircraft and flying international routes will
provide them with a profitable specialization.
The cost-efficient linear model airlines flying midsize aircraft
will specialize in providing capacity wherever prices are high. In
the past, linear airlines focused on high-density routes. That
strategy makes sense if passengers cannot connect to a different
carrier's flights. However, passengers under mixed optimization
will be able to connect on a legacy or regional carrier without a
cost penalty. So, under mixed optimization, the linear model
airlines can apply their operational excellence to any route.
For linear model airlines, high prices on a route are a signal
that they should begin low-cost service along that route without
considering whether the passengers are connecting or nonstop.
(Of course, as capacity increases price will decrease.) There-
fore, today's linear model airlines and their midsize aircraft will
fill in the gaps in capacity, ensuring that no airline has excessive
market power or pricing power along any route.
The mixed optimization model offers opportunities for each
type of airline-legacy, linear, and regional-based on their
current expertise and fleet mix. By eliminating an unnecessary
constraint (the inability to switch airlines enroute), more oppor-
tunity is available to all. The artificial congestion, delays, and
high prices of the hub system (as well as the cycle of bankruptcy
and retrenchment to primary hubs) will disappear.
The only negative impact to consumers from the mixed op-
timization system will be an increase in scheduled layover
length. With airplanes arriving and departing at more evenly
spaced times throughout the day, scheduled layovers will be
longer than under the hub system. However, unscheduled de-
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lays will be reduced. The author believes most consumers will
accept this tradeoff. But airlines will offer nonstop flights to ac-
commodate the consumers willing to pay for the time savings.
In either case, the bait-and-switch of hub connections that are
short in schedule but long in practice will end.
D. LEGAL IMPLEMENTATION OF MIXED OPTIMIZATION
There are two basic methods for the federal government to
implement mixed optimization in the airline industry. The
most clear-cut and powerful method is for Congress to amend
the Airline Deregulation Act directly. The first alteration would
prohibit airlines from making the ticket price on one flight de-
pendent on whether a customer purchases a seat on a connect-
ing flight. The second alteration would authorize the Secretary
of Transportation to promulgate and enforce rules for
mandatory bag interchange between airlines. Both of these al-
terations fall under Congress's authority to regulate interstate
and foreign commerce. Since they are far less intrusive than the
prior CAB fare-and-route regulation, they should withstand any
constitutional challenge in court.
The alternative method depends on the Secretary of Trans-
portation's power to regulate unfair methods of competition
under Section 41712 of the Federal Aviation Act.' 17 Under the
Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (as well as several of its prede-
cessors), the airlines are not subject to Federal Trade Commis-
sion regulation of unfair methods of competition.' i Instead,
Congress provided a separate avenue of DOT enforcement.
The first relevant provision reads, "On the initiative of the
Secretary of Transportation ... and if the Secretary considers it
is in the public interest, the Secretary may investigate and de-
cide whether an air carrier ... is engaged in an unfair or decep-
tive practice or an unfair method of competition in air
transportation."'19 The second relevant provision reads, "If the
Secretary, after notice and an opportunity for a hearing, finds
that an air carrier ... is engaged in an unfair or deceptive prac-
117 49 U.S.C. § 41712 (2006).
118 Dempsey, supra note 21, at 791 ("Every other industry in our economy is
subject to the oversight of the Federal Trade Commission. Airlines are not. Nor
are airlines subject to the deceptive practices regulation of the states, under the
broad construction of the preemption provisions of the Airline Deregulation Act
of 1978.").
19 49 U.S.C. § 41712 (2006).
714
MIXED OPTIMIZATION
tice or unfair method of competition, the Secretary shall order
the air carrier . . . to stop the practice or method."' 20
If the Secretary of Transportation implements mixed op-
timization in order to prevent unfair competition for connect-
ing traffic, the Chevron standard will apply to his decision.
Under Chevron:
If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is
an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a
specific provision of the statute by regulation. Such legislative
regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary,
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute."12
Because of the standard of Chevron deference, any legal chal-
lenge to mixed optimization would face an uphill battle. How-
ever, it is not clear what interest groups would have a vested
interest in opposing mixed optimization. Admittedly, all three
categories of airlines (legacy, regional, and linear) would face
dramatic changes as a result of mixed optimization. But the
changes appear to offer the legacy airlines a way to escape their
downward spiral while also offering linear and regional airlines
a broader arena to expand and compete.
In the final analysis, mixed optimization offers benefits to
consumers, taxpayers, and airlines. It can be thought of as a
technology-enabled extension of the original airline deregula-
tion, creating competition on every segment of every trip. It can
be implemented either by Congress or by the DOT; either im-
plementation should withstand legal challenge.
120 Id.
121 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-
844 (1984).
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